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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Enterprise 
and Innovation. Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the motives of high-tech acquirers by analysing their 
revealed preferences in terms of the high-tech companies they acquire.  Using a 
large  sample  of  acquisitions  involving  publicly  traded  firms  from  various 
countries we ask whether high technology acquisitions are best understood in 
terms of acquirers seeking to source externally special innovation-related assets 
by acquiring firms with “superior” innovative performance; or acquirers seeking 
to acquire firms with “inferior” innovative performance in order to turn them 
around.  We find evidence that acquisition is a very noisy phenomenon and that 
economic and innovation related variables explain only a modest part of the 
probability of becoming a target.  We do however find that, compared to non-
acquired firms, high-tech targets tend to be somewhat larger, to have poorer 
profitability, lower Tobin’s q and liquidity. In relation to their innovative profile, 
targets,  in  general,  seem  to  have  a  relatively  larger  stock  of  accumulated 
knowledge (stock of citation-weighted patents), relatively higher R&D inputs 
(R&D-intensity), but they are more likely to generate no R&D output (citation-
weighted  patent-intensity)  before  they  are  acquired.    We  conclude  that  high 
technology acquisitions reflect a process which is primarily driven by acquirers 
wishing to exploit the potential for turning around firms which, despite a good 
past record, appear to be innovatively and economically inefficient before they 
are acquired. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Preferences and motives driving actions are not frequently directly observable.  
Researchers can however attempt to elicit them from observing the behaviour of 
the organizations in which they are formed.  In this paper we investigate the 
motives  of  high  technology  acquirers  of  public  high  technology  targets  by 
analysing their revealed preferences in terms of the companies they  acquire.  
The  majority  of  the  existing  empirical  literature  has  concentrated  on  the 
financial  characteristics  of  the  acquired  firms  (Mueller,  1980;  Palepu,  1986; 
Morck et al, 1988; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997; Dickerson et 
al., 1998).  However, in a high technology context, where the innovative activity 
of  firms  is  a  crucial  determinant  of  economic  performance  (Franko,  1989; 
Amendola et al., 1993; Geroski et al., 1993; Cosh et al., 1996), the role of the 
effort devoted to the R&D process and its output is of special interest when 
modelling the takeover likelihood.   
 
Along  these  lines,  two  recent  studies  that  examine  the  relationship  between 
R&D and acquisition activity on the acquirer’s side, stress the importance of 
work  to  uncover  targets’  innovative  characteristics  to  fully  understand  their 
findings (Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Dessyllas and Hughes, 2005).  Blonigen 
and Taylor (2000), using a sample of 531 acquisitions by US electronic and 
electrical equipment firms during the period 1985-93, find that acquisitions are 
used  as  a  substitute  for  in-house  R&D  activity.    This  result  is  verified  by 
Dessyllas and Hughes (2005)  for acquirers of private targets and subsidiaries 
but not for public targets in an international sample of a 9,744 public and private 
acquisitions during the period 1984-2001.
i  They argue that, although smaller 
acquisitions can be seen as part of an innovation strategy by acquiring firms 
with  relatively  low  levels  of  internal  R&D  which  seek  to  offset  low  R&D 
productivity,  there  is  little  to  be  said  on  acquisitions  of  the  normally  larger 
public targets. 
 
This  study  fills  this  void  in  the  empirical  literature  by  investigating  the 
innovative characteristics of public targets in order to cast some light upon the 
rationale of high technology acquisitions involving public firms.  The resources 
devoted  by  acquirers  to  purchases  of  public  targets  account  for  the  vast 
proportion of all acquisition expenditures (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002).  In particular, 
acquisitions  involving  public  high  technology  firms  operating  in  ten  of  the 
largest industrial economies accounted for over 74% of the $2.7 trillion of their 
total acquisition activity during the period 1984-2001.
ii 
 
Although we recognise that, in practice, the thousands of deals that take place 
may  represent  the  aggregation  of  very  different  activities  and  hence  the  
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hypotheses about their rationale might not be mutually exclusive (Bower, 2001; 
Mueller, 2003), we ask whether these acquisitions are best understood in terms 
of  two  competing  hypotheses.    The  first  one  is  called  “Searching  for 
superiority”, according to which acquirers will tend to acquire highly innovative 
firms.  This hypothesis draws upon March’s (1991) theoretical framework that 
distinguishes between explorative and exploitative learning.  It is argued that 
acquisitions can be used as an expansion method that enhances exploration and 
helps  overcome  the  inertia  and  rigidity  associated  with  an  emphasis  on  the 
exploitation of a firm' s existing knowledge base through greenfield investment 
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  The second hypothesis is called “Searching 
for inferiority”, according to which acquirers will tend to acquire firms with 
relatively  poor  innovative  performance.    Their  acquirers  can  take  advantage 
from such acquisitions by turning around innovatively inefficient firms.  This 
hypothesis originates from the traditional market for corporate control theory 
which states that competition in product and capital markets ensures that poor 
performers  in  economic  or  stock  market  terms  will  be  eliminated  from  the 
market  place  (Singh,  1975,  1992).    It  is,  however,  taken  forward  from  its 
standard form in the financial economics literature by being interpreted in a high 
technology context and pegged to specific target innovative characteristics.   
 
Controlling for a rich set of financial variables that have been found to affect the 
takeover likelihood (e.g. Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 
1997), the empirical analysis of target innovative characteristics accounts for 
both the inputs into the conduct of R&D and its output.  It proxies R&D inputs 
by R&D expenditure per $million total assets (R&D-intensity), and R&D output 
by two patent-based measures. The first is the stock of accumulated knowledge 
that  has  been  generated  by  past  R&D  which  is  proxied  by  the  patent  stock 
measured in both raw terms and citation weighted form. The second is patent-
intensity proxied by the number of patents per $million of total assets – again in 
raw and weighted form.   
 
Systematic evidence on the innovative characteristics of the acquired firms is 
scarce.    To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  only  study  that  provides  a 
comprehensive analysis of target innovative characteristics, accounting for both 
the inputs (R&D expenditure) of the conduct of R&D and its output (patents) is 
for a sample of 116 takeovers of high-tech US public firms during the period 
1977-1984 (Addanki, 1986).  Addanki finds that firms that do R&D but have no 
patents are likely to be targets in takeovers.  More generally, the probability of 
being  acquired  is  negatively  related  to  the  number  of  patents.    His  results 
suggest that successful innovators are less likely to be acquired.  The likelihood 
of being acquired is not affected by firm size (log of assets), but it is positively 
related to a negative shock in a firm’s stock price.
iii  
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Two  additional  relevant  studies  were  carried  out  by  Hall  (1988,  1999).  
Although these studies do not account for R&D output measures, they provide 
evidence on the effect of R&D-intensity on the probability of being acquired.  
Hall (1988), using a sample of 568 manufacturing acquisitions in the US during 
the period 1976-1986, finds no significant difference between acquired and non-
acquired firms in terms of size (assets) and R&D-intensity (stock of R&D over 
assets).  Only firms acquired by private or foreign firms have a significantly 
lower R&D-intensity, but this is due rather to the fact that these targets tend to 
belong to non-high-tech industries (e.g. textiles), than to a trend having to do 
with the public status or origin of the acquirer.  In her 1999 study, which is 
based  on  a  sample  of  861  manufacturing  acquisitions  in  the  US  during  the 
period 1976-1993, she finds that targets tend to be relatively smaller (employee 
number),  and  to  have  lower  Tobin' s  q.  Although  no  significant  continuous 
relationship  emerges  between  the  probability  of  being  acquired  and  R&D-
intensity (R&D over sales), firms with a particularly high R&D-intensity (more 
than 50%) are less likely to be acquired.  Acquired firms do not differ from non-
acquired firms with respect to other variables employed, such as capital-labour 
ratio and cash flow ratio. 
 
Our study takes the debate on the innovative characteristics of targets further by: 
(a) using more recent evidence – including acquisitions from the late 1990s – 
and  including  acquisitions  that  involve  firms  from  both  the  US  and  other 
countries; (b) focusing on acquisitions involving high technology firms to ensure 
that innovation is an important element in corporate strategy and performance; 
(c) employing proxies for both the inputs of the conduct of R&D and its output.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops 
the theoretical background and hypotheses of this study.  This is followed by a 
section describing the data and the methodology employed. Then, the empirical 
results from the analysis and their implications for the hypotheses are discussed.  
The final section presents the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of 
this paper.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Searching for superiority 
March  (1991)  argues  that  organizations  in  order  to  adapt  and  survive  in  a 
changing competitive environment need to allocate their limited resources so as 
to strike a balance between exploration of new alternatives and exploitation of 
existing competences and technologies.  In a business environment, exploration 
without exploitation will prevent a firm from fully appropriating the returns that  
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can be generated from the application of new knowledge aimed at improving or 
renewing processes, products or services.  However, the on-going exploitation 
of the existing knowledge without exploration, after a point hampers the creation 
of new knowledge and eventually make the firm simple, rigid and unsuccessful 
(March, 1991; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  On the one hand, the ongoing 
exploitation  of  a  firm’s  technology  base  is  likely  to  lead  to  technological 
exhaustion  because  most  of  the  possible  relationships  between  a  set  of 
components have already been tried (Fleming, 2001; Kim and Kogut, 1996).  On 
the  other  hand,  the  refinement  and  extension  of  existing  competences  and 
technologies is likely to trap a firm in sub-optimal equilibria (March, 1991). 
 
Firms  can  extend  their  knowledge  base  by  getting  access  to  other  firms’ 
resources, particularly when they are not perfectly mobile or imitable (Das and 
Teng, 2000).  Hence, acquisitions can be employed as a means of technological 
renewal and restoring technological diversity and of avoiding the inertia and 
simplicity that results from the repeated exploitation of a firm’s knowledge base 
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  The empirical evidence supports this role of 
acquisitions (Capron and Mitchell, 1998; Bresman et al., 1999; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001).  There is also a growing literature suggesting that firms should 
and  do  use  various  forms  of  corporate  venturing  to  learn  from  knowledge 
sources beyond the boundaries of the firm (Schildt et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 
2003). 
 
Even  in  cases  where  the  desired  assets,  resources  or  capabilities  can  be 
developed internally, acquisitions can be the preferred strategy representing a 
less risky and faster way of exploiting commercially viable knowledge assets 
(Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Francis and Smith, 1995).  If successfully completed
iv, 
an acquisition can be seen as a less risky strategy, as some uncertainty inherent 
in the innovation process (Arrow, 1962) is resolved before the acquisition time.  
An  acquisition-intensive  strategy  can  then  be  understood  in  a  real  option 
framework (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  The decision not to invest in risky R&D 
projects  is  the  equivalent  of  getting  the  right  to  acquire  the  winning  firm 
(innovator)  after  uncertainty  has  been  resolved.    Also,  acquisitions  have  the 
advantage that acquired companies have track records that can be analysed to 
make financial projections for future costs and expected performance (Hitt et al., 
1996).  A takeover is a faster strategy when in-house R&D or some other stage 
along the value chain requires complementary assets that a firm does not possess 
(Teece, 1992, 1998).  This is particularly true when there are no markets for 
such assets or when the target is further along the learning curve of a particular 
knowledge field.  The time advantages of acquisitions are empirically verified 
by Danzon et al. (2004) who find evidence that acquisitions are employed by  
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pharmaceutical firms as a quick reaction to an unexpected short-fall in their 
R&D pipe-line.   
 
These arguments suggest that acquirers that wish to source external innovation-
related assets will direct their acquisition activity toward firms with a “superior” 
innovative  activity.    Accordingly,  we  hypothesize  that  the  targets  in  such 
acquisitions will be firms with a “superior” innovative record reflected in high 
R&D-intensity,  high patent-intensity,  and a  high  stock  of accumulated  R&D 
output generated by past R&D efforts. 
 
Searching for inferiority 
The  searching  for  inferiority  view  of  high  technology  acquisitions  takes  the 
opposite stance compared to the previous hypothesis.  The key idea can be found 
in various streams of literature; firms with excess resources buy weaker firms 
and then use the acquirer’s excess resources to improve the performance of the 
target (See Capron and Mitchell, 1998).  We focus here on the theory of the 
market  for  corporate  control  which  is  one  of  the  most  frequently  cited 
approaches in the financial and economic literature on acquisitions.   
 
The market for corporate control theory states that competition in product and 
capital markets implies that poor performers in economic or stock market terms 
will be eliminated from the market place (Singh, 1975, 1992).  In this sense, the 
market for corporate control is viewed as an arena in which managerial teams 
compete for the rights to manage corporate assets ensuring that assets are shifted 
to their most efficient uses or management (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 
1986).    Because  of  the  high  technology  focus  of  this  study,  this  theory  is, 
however, extended from its standard form in the financial economics literature 
to account for the empirical evidence of the existence of a positive relationship 
between  innovative  activity  and  economic  performance  (Franko,  1989; 
Amendola et al., 1993; Geroski et al., 1993; Cosh et al., 1996).  For this purpose, 
the  performance  assumptions  expressed  in  economic  terms  are  restated  in 
innovation terms.  Accordingly, this model would predict that firms with a poor 
record of innovative performance will tend to be acquired by efficient firms who 
wish to exploit the potential for turning the former around.  Poor innovative 
performance may arise for a number of reasons, such as under-investment in 
R&D,  failure  to  direct  research  to  the  appropriate  area,  ill-chosen  research 
projects, inadequate or inappropriate human or physical capital, or management 
of projects.  The consequences of poor innovativeness can be recorded as lack of 
cutting-edge products or relatively costly operations.   
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An  auxiliary  explanation  that  deserves  some  attention  in  elaborating  on  the 
acquirers’ acquisition motives in the contest of the market for control is derived 
from internalisation theory (Morck and Yeung, 1992).  According to this theory, 
certain assets, and particularly intangible assets such as technical knowledge, are 
better exploited by acquisition to “internalise” the activity inhibiting either firm 
contracting  because of  market  failures  as  well as  the  potential  for  spreading 
fixed  costs  over  a  larger  scale.    Such  firms  will  prefer  an  acquisition  to 
greenfield expansion under the assumption that the stock market penalizes the 
firms (i.e. potential targets) whose innovative performance falls short from its 
potential.
v  The firms wishing to expand will compare the costs of acquiring the 
assets they need through de novo investment and the costs of acquiring these 
assets  already  in  place  (Hasbrouck,  1985).    Then,  inefficient  targets  will  be 
viewed by their acquirers as “bargains” or “cheap buys” (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 
1997). 
 
Taken  together,  these  arguments  suggest  that  acquirers  will  be  primarily 
motivated  by  the  potential  for  turning  around  innovatively  “inferior”  firms.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that targets in such acquisitions will be firms with a 
poor innovative record reflected in some combination of a low R&D-intensity, 
low patent-intensity, and a low stock of accumulated R&D output generated by 




Acquisitions are defined as deals where the acquiring firm owns less than 50% 
of target’s voting shares before the takeover and increases its ownership to at 
least 50% as a result of the takeover.  Furthermore, high technology acquisitions 
are defined as deals in which the acquirer has some part of its sales in one of the 
high technology industries specified by Hall and Vopel (1996)
vi and both the 
acquiring  and  the  acquired  firms  have  their  primary  activity  in  SIC  28 
Chemicals and Allied Products, SIC 35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery 
and Computer Equipment, SIC 36 Electronics and Electrical Equipment, SIC 37 
Transportation  Equipment,  SIC  38  Measuring,  Analyzing  and  Controlling 
Instruments;  Photographic,  Medical  and  Optical  Goods,  SIC  48 
Communications, SIC 73 Business Services, SIC 87 Engineering, Accounting, 
Research,  Management,  and  Related  Services.
vii    We  focus  on  acquisitions 
involving publicly traded firms operating in one of the ten most merger-active 
industrialized countries
viii, namely Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  UK,  and  the  US.    The  population  of  
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acquisition deals come from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum, which reports 
1,635 deals
ix announced during the period from January 1984 to June 2001.   
 
The innovative activity of firms is measured using data on the inputs of the 
conduct of R&D (R&D expenditure) and its output in the form of intellectual 
property registered as patents.  However, because the distribution of the value of 
patented innovations is extremely skewed (Scherer 1997), we also consider for 
each patent the number of forward citations it receives by subsequent patents to 
approximate its value.  A patent which is cited many times is more likely to be 
highly valued than a patent which is relatively rarely cited (Griliches, 1990). 
 
Financial data and data on R&D expenditure for the period 1983-2001 were 
collected  from  Datastream,  Compustat  and  Global  Vantage.    Data  on  patent 
counts  and  patent  citations
x  were  collected  from  the  NBER  dataset  which 
includes  all  the  utility  patents  granted  by  the  US  Patent  and  Trade  Office 
(USPTO) with our series covering the period from 1983 until 1999 and 1997 
respectively (Hall et al., 2001).
xi  Moreover, because firms often register patents 
under their subsidiaries’ names (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2000), we used Dun & 
Bradstreet’s “Who owns whom” annual issues to obtain their detailed corporate 
structure and patent data were aggregated at the parent firm level.  Combining 
these databases we construct a unique unbalanced panel dataset covering the 
period 1983-2001 which consists of financial and innovation-related variables 
on a maximum of 6,425 firms, including both acquired and non-acquired firms. 
 
The sample over which the financial characteristics and R&D-intensity of firms 
are examined includes 511 acquisitions after imposing the restriction that data 
are  available  on  all  the  key  financial  variables.
xii    These  deals  account  for 
approximately 31% of the volume and 40% of the value of the total acquisition 
activity included in the initial sample.  The patent- and citation-weighted patent-
based characteristics of firms can only be assessed on the basis of a sample 
including 448 and 328 acquisitions respectively.  This is because, on the one 
hand, only a subset of the acquired firms is linked to patent assignees at the 
USPTO, and on the other hand, our patent and citation data end in 1999 and 
1997, respectively.  The fall in the size of the sample of acquired firms over 
which the pre-acquisition firm characteristics are assessed introduces some bias 
towards larger firms.  While the overall median size (ln total assets in $1996 
thousands) of all acquired firms equals 11.18, the median size of the 511 targets 
with the required data equals 11.28.  The bias is more serious for the sample of 
firms  over  which  their  patent-based  characteristics  are  assessed,  where  the 
median size of the 448 targets equals 12.89.  This larger size imbalance arises 
from the fact that the firms linked to patent assignees tend to be relatively larger 
compared with those not linked.  
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The variables 
The  probability  of  being  acquired  is  modelled  as  a  function  of  key  firm 
characteristics, using an unbalanced panel dataset which consists of innovation-
related characteristics and financial variables on both acquired and non-acquired 
firms for which data are available in some years during the period 1983-2001.   
 
Independent variables 
The innovative profile of firms is examined with respect to their R&D inputs, 
R&D output, and the stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D 
efforts.  Because of the large size differences across firms, R&D inputs, proxied 
by R&D expenditure, and R&D output, proxied by the number of successful 
patent applications, are normalized by firm size (See for example Blonigen and 
Taylor, 2000; Hall, 1999; Hitt et al., 1991).  Therefore, R&D inputs are defined 
as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets and we refer to this ratio as R&D-
intensity.
xiii  R&D output is defined as the ratio of the number of successful 
patent applications to $million of total assets
xiv and we refer to this ratio  as 
patent-intensity.  The stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D 
efforts is measured by the stock of patents
xv, which is calculated by the standard 
perpetual inventory formula assuming a 15% depreciation rate per annum (See 
Hall, 1990).  The patent-intensity and the patent stock are also calculated using 
the number of normalized citations received by forward patents to account not 
only for the quantity  (raw patent count) but also the quality of the patented 
inventions.  The disadvantage of citation-weighted patent measures is that the 
citation data end in 1997. 
 
Control variables 
The set of firm characteristics that were considered to model the acquisition 
probability also included some additional financial variables, in accordance with 
earlier  studies  (Singh, 1975;  Palepu, 1986;  Hall,  1988, 1999;  Powell,  1997).  
This is because some variables, such as firm size, are likely to influence both the 
innovative and acquisition activity of firms.  The controls employed proxy for 
firm size, economic performance, and the availability of financial resources.   
 
Firm size is proxied by the book value of total assets.  We have chosen this 
specific size measure, because it has the best coverage among all the alternatives 
considered (sales, number of employees, net assets).  A recent relevant study 
employing a similar proxy is Powell (1997).   
 
The economic performance is proxied by three variables.  First, firm growth, 
which is calculated as the annual growth of total assets.  Second, profitability,  
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which is proxied by operating return and is calculated as the ratio of earnings 
before interest taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets.  
Third, Tobin’s q, which we approximate by calculating the ratio of total assets 
plus  the  market  value  of  common  equity  minus  the  book  value  of  common 
equity to total assets (See Blanchard et al., 1994; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 
Andrade and Stafford, 2000) 
xvi.  The interpretation of the effect of Tobin’s q on 
the  acquisition  probability  should  be  treated  with  care,  since,  apart  from 
reflecting stock undervaluation (Morck et al., 1988), it is also likely to reflect 
managerial performance (Powell, 1997) or, having a forward looking numerator, 
a firm’s growth opportunities (Gugler et al., 2004).   
 
The financial status of firms is proxied by leverage and liquidity.  Leverage, 
which is employed as a proxy of a firm’s capital structure, reflects the financial 
risk faced by a firm which might limit managers’ ability to allocate adequate 
resources to R&D activity (Smith and Warner, 1979).  It is calculated as the 
ratio of long-term debt to the book value of common equity.  Liquidity, which 
measures  a  firm’s  ability  to  meet  its  short-term  obligations  from  its  current 
assets, is calculated as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  We also 
accounted for the cash flow ratio as a proxy for the amount of funds available to 
a firm for operations and investment.  However, it was eventually excluded from 
the models estimated to avoid possible multicollinearity bias, since it was found 
highly correlated (0.96) with operating return (See Table 1).   
 
Model specification 
We  employ  a  logit  model  (See  Greene,  1997,  Chapter  19)  to  estimate  the 
acquisition probability, since the takeover incidence in a given year takes strictly 
non-negative  values  and  hence  the  classical  linear  model  is  inadequate.
xvii  
Similar estimation methods have been used in previous empirical work (Palepu, 
1986; Hall, 1988, 1999; Powell, 1997).  Given the cross-section and time series 
nature of our dataset, we initially considered panel data estimation methods that 
have  the  advantage  that  they  allow  us  to  account  for  some  unobserved 
heterogeneity  across  firms  (Hsiao,  1986).    However,  we  found  that  the  null 
hypothesis that the panel-level variance component
xviii is unimportant could not 
be rejected at the 5% significance level and the estimates from the random-
effects
xix  estimator  were  identical  to  those  from  the  simple  logit  model.  
Therefore only the simple logit model estimates are reported.  Robust standard 
errors to within-firm serial correlation are calculated, since even if firm-specific 
effects  are  uncorrelated  with  the  regressors,  the  composite  errors  might  be 
serially  correlated due to the  presence of a  firm-specific  effect in  each  time 
period.   
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables.
xx  It 
is interesting to notice that firm size and the stock of accumulated knowledge 
(patent  stock  in  raw  or  weighted form)  are  not  particularly  correlated.    The 
rather counterintuitive negative correlation coefficient between Tobin’s q and 
operating returns is found to be due to the effect of some observations with 
negative  operating  return,  and  we  actually  obtain  a  positive  correlation 
coefficient (0.39) for observations with non-negative operating return.    
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics & correlations, max 53,873 observations on 6,425 firms, 1983-2001 
 
 
    Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  Total Assets (ln)  53,873  11.637  11.550  2.240  5.114  17.529  1.00                         
2  Total Assets Growth  53,873  0.359  0.055  1.488  -0.782  15.083  -0.04  1.00                       
3  Operating Return  53,873  -0.021  0.085  0.488  -4.858  0.539  0.37  0.00  1.00                     
4  Tobin' s q (ln)  53,873  0.583  0.410  0.734  -0.853  3.779  -0.25  0.16  -0.31  1.00                   
5  Cash Flow Ratio  53,668  -0.067  0.050  0.508  -5.211  0.387  0.36  0.01  0.96  -0.32  1.00                 
6  Leverage  53,873  0.615  0.249  2.452  -14.957  22.605  0.14  -0.01  0.05  -0.10  0.05  1.00               
7  Liquidity  53,873  3.067  1.894  3.998  0.046  36.217  -0.18  0.26  -0.01  0.14  0.00  -0.09  1.00             
8  R&D-intensity (un-adjusted)  46,690  0.088  0.031  0.175  0.000  1.784  -0.36  -0.01  -0.63  0.40  -0.62  -0.10  0.10  1.00           
9  R&D-intensity   53,873  0.076  0.018  0.165  0.000  1.784  -0.32  -0.01  -0.57  0.38  -0.56  -0.09  0.10  1.00  1.00         
10  Patent Stock (ln)  18,749  0.379  1.487  4.617  -9.210  7.698  0.39  -0.06  0.04  0.01  0.04  -0.01  -0.07  0.02  0.04  1.00       
11  Cite-weighted Patent Stock (ln)  15,647  -0.112  1.507  5.153  -9.210  7.671  0.38  -0.06  0.06  0.00  0.06  -0.02  -0.07  0.01  0.03  0.95  1.00     
12  Patent-intensity  18,749  0.027  0.000  0.097  0.000  1.298  -0.23  0.06  -0.22  0.23  -0.20  -0.05  0.12  0.28  0.28  0.13  0.15  1.00   
13  Cite-weighted Patent-intensity  15,647  0.040  0.000  0.174  0.000  2.237  -0.20  0.07  -0.19  0.22  -0.17  -0.04  0.09  0.25  0.25  0.11  0.15  0.73  1.00 
ln indicates the natural logarithm.  Total Assets are measured in $1996 thousands.  R&D-intensity is reported both un-adjusted and adjusted where missing observations are assumed to be zero if data on all the 
financial variables considered are available (this adjustment excludes German firms).  Correlations with absolute value exceeding 0.50 are highlighted.  
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Because patent data are not available for a large number of firms, estimating a 
single  regression,  including  all  the  independent  variables,  would  introduce  a 
serious bias against smaller public firms and would lead to a dramatic reduction 
of  firm-year  observations.    To  overcome  this  problem,  we  adopted  two 
complementary  model  specifications,  and  the  robustness  of  our  findings  is 
examined by estimating a specification including all the independent variables 
together.  The first one models the probability of being acquired as a function of 
some  key  financial  characteristics  (total  assets,  total  asset  growth,  operating 
return, Tobin’s q, leverage and liquidity) and R&D-intensity.  The second one 
models  the  same  probabilities  as  a  function  of  a  subset  of  financial 
characteristics  (total  assets,  total  asset  growth  and  operating  return),  R&D-
intensity, the stock of patents and patent-intensity in raw or citation-weighted 
form.  Although measures based on citation-weighted patent-intensity are likely 
to be better proxies of the importance of innovation output, we also consider 
measures based on raw patent counts as this allows a larger sample size, since 
citation data end in 1997.   
 
The econometric models are estimated over completed acquisitions during the 
period 1984-2002 that involve firms with the appropriate data.  All covariates 
have been lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems.  Country, industry 
and  time  dummy  variables  are  included  in  the  estimated  specifications  to 
account for the possibility of time or cross-sectional dependence of deals (Beck 
et al., 1997).
xxi  Because we find evidence for the existence of some influential 
outliers, data are winsorized at 1% (0.5% from each side).   
 
To  account  for  other  idiosyncrasies  (skewness,  missing  observations,  non-
linearity)  of  some  of  the  variables  some  additional  adjustments  have  been 
adopted.
xxii  First, a dummy variable is employed for very negative operating 
returns, that is for EBITDA losses of more than half the firm’s total assets, in 
which  case  the  continuous  variable  is  set  to  zero.    A  similar  adjustment  is 
adopted by Hall (1999) to proxy for highly R&D-intensive growth firms in an 
early  stage  of  their  life  cycle  without  many  marketed  products.    Second,  a 
dummy variable is employed for missing R&D values which equals one when 
R&D is missing and R&D-intensity is set equal to zero.  That is, similar to Hall 
(1999),  we  assume  that  R&D-intensity  is  immaterial  whenever  R&D-
expenditure  is  not  reported  but  data  on  most  of  the  economic  variables  are 
available.    In  the  analysis  that  follows,  we  check  for  the  robustness  of  our 
findings to this normalisation.  Third, a dummy is employed for firms with zero 
(citation-weighted)  patent-intensity,  to  distinguish  between  firms  with  some 
versus no R&D output.
xxiii  Finally, a dummy is employed for observations in 
which  the  logarithm  of  total  assets  exceeds  the  fourth  percentile  of  all  
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observations  (13.17),  as  we  suspect  some  non-linearity  in  the  relationship 




Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for the simple logit model estimated over 
53,873 observations on 6,425 firms, including 511 acquisitions.  Focusing on the 
regression  over  the  full  sample,  despite  a  rather  low  McFadden  R-squared 
(9.2%), the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the model as a whole does 
no better than simply using a constant term at a 5% significance level.  The low 
R-squared is not a surprise, given the evidence from previous empirical work 
that  the  distinction  between  acquired  and  non-acquired  firms  is  blurred  in 
practice with major overlaps between the two groups (e.g. Hughes, 1993; Hall, 
1999; Gugler et al., 2004). 
 
Although the firm characteristics that are employed as regressors are found to be 
jointly significant by a likelihood ratio test, a large part of the explanatory power 
of  the  model  seems  to  come  from  the  year,  country  and  industry  dummies, 
which are also jointly significant.  The results suggest that the (log) odds of a 
firm being a takeover target increases with firm size, but only up to a certain 
level, after which it decreases (due to the significantly negative dummy for very 
large size).  Also, targets tend to have statistically significantly lower operating 
return, lower Tobin’s q, and lower liquidity, as well as a significantly higher 
R&D-intensity.    
  14
 
Table 2. Regressions for estimating the probability of being acquired 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
Regressor  All  US  Non-US 
Constant  -9.541*  -9.457*  -21.457* 
  (0.835)  (0.864)  (0.087) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.202*  0.205*  0.227* 
  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.088) 
Dummy High T. Assets  -0.723*  -0.749*  -0.808** 
  (0.19)  (0.217)  (0.431) 
Total Assets Growth  -0.059  -0.050  -0.035 
  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.133) 
Op. Return  -0.552**  -0.435  -1.435** 
  (0.326)  (0.343)  (0.848) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  -0.104  -0.150  0.391 
  (0.236)  (0.253)  (0.599) 
Tobin' s q (ln)  -0.217*  -0.282*  0.021 
  (0.079)  (0.093)  (0.13) 
Leverage  -0.020  -0.016  -0.046 
  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.049) 
Liquidity  -0.032*  -0.028**  -0.135* 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.05) 
R&D-intensity  0.946*  1.111*  0.593 
  (0.232)  (0.243)  (0.772) 
Dummy No R&D  0.052  -0.046  0.873* 
  (0.124)  (0.138)  (0.392) 
Country dummies  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry & Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of Observations  53,873  31,381  22,080 
No of Acquisitions  511  407  104 
Wald Test  308.55  245.04  212.59 
Degrees of Freedom  45  36  43 
P-value  0  0  0 
Log Likelihood  -2,623.9  -2,018.7  -539.3 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.07  0.18 
* (**) Indicates a significant coefficient at 5% (10%) level.  Robust standard errors to within-firm serial correlation are 
reported in parentheses.  ln indicates the natural logarithm.  Total Assets are measured in $1996 thousands.  “Non-US” 
regression includes firms from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  
The base industry is SIC 283 and the base year is 2002.  In the first column the base country is the US, and in the last column 
it is the UK.    
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Panel B. Financial variables, R&D-intensity and patent-related variables 
  Patents  Citation-weighted Patents 
Regressor  All  US  Non-US  All  US  Non-US 
Constant  -5.444*  -5.606*  -4.352  -5.698*  -5.917*  0.077 
  (0.568)  (0.584)  (3.138)  (0.646)  (0.659)  (3.925) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.151*  0.163*  -0.040  0.187*  0.199*  -0.182 
  (0.04)  (0.041)  (0.241)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.315) 
Dummy High T. Assets  -0.613*  -0.642*  -0.132  -0.807*  -0.827*  -0.277 
  (0.204)  (0.21)  (1.076)  (0.245)  (0.252)  (1.132) 
Total Assets Growth  -0.097  -0.094  -0.335  -0.055  -0.054  -0.376 
  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.526)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.782) 
Op. Return   -0.118  -0.174  1.815  -0.234  -0.183  -3.540 
  (0.33)  (0.333)  (2.28)  (0.393)  (0.397)  (4.506) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  -0.188  -0.212  -0.018  -0.142  -0.119  0.000 
  (0.242)  (0.249)  (1.311)  (0.289)  (0.291)  (0) 
R&D-intensity  0.491**  0.536*  1.082  0.631*  0.652*  -3.055 
  (0.254)  (0.255)  (1.99)  (0.301)  (0.3)  (7.911) 
Dummy No R&D  -0.102  -0.127  1.436  -0.054  -0.090  2.470** 
  (0.176)  (0.181)  (1.057)  (0.205)  (0.209)  (1.4) 
Patent Stock (ln)  0.042*  0.036*  0.187**       
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.104)       
Patent-intensity  -0.195  -0.200  0.356       
  (0.477)  (0.493)  (1.407)       
Dummy Zero Patent-intensity  0.227  0.207  0.933       
  (0.146)  (0.151)  (0.628)       
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)        0.036*  0.034*  0.109 
        (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.093) 
Citation-wtd Patent-intensity        0.053  0.099  -0.875 
        (0.305)  (0.301)  (2.465) 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity        0.326**  0.365*  -0.519 
        (0.172)  (0.175)  (0.829) 
Country dummies  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry & Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of Observations  23,977  18,265  3,280  20,576  15,761  2,396 
No of acquisitions  448  428  20  328  316  12 
Wald Test  201.1  166.4  91.8  113.9  90.0  246.1 
Degrees of Freedom  37  34  27  35  32  22 
P-value  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Log Likelihood  -2,043.2  -1,942.0  -87.0  -1,566.2  -1,497.9  -55.9 
Pseudo R-squared  0.08  0.04  0.29  0.07  0.03  0.26 
The regressions include firms from Canada, Japan, the UK and the US.  In the patent-based regressions the base industry is SIC 283 
and the base year is 2000.  In the citation-weighted patent regressions the base industry is SIC 283 and the base year is1998.  In the 
first and fourth columns the base country is the US, and in the third and sixth columns it is the UK.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A. 
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Panel  B  of  Table  2  shows  the  results  for  the  patent-based  and  the  citation-
weighted  patent-based  specifications  estimated  over  23,977  and  20,576 
observations including 448 and 328 acquisitions respectively.  The fall in the 
sample  size  implies  that  only  observations  on  firms  from  the  US,  the  UK, 
Canada and Japan survive.  Focusing on the regressions for the full sample, 
despite  the  small  values  of  the  McFadden  R-squared  for  both  specifications 
(8.2% and 6.9%), the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are jointly zero.  Controlling for firm size, growth and operating 
performance, the significantly positive relationship between R&D-intensity and 
the acquisition probability is verified, while we also find a significantly positive 
relationship  between  the  size  of  the  (citation-weighted)  patent  stock  and  the 
acquisition  probability.    Although  a  negative  relationship  between  patent-
intensity and the acquisition probability is implied by the negative coefficient of 
patent-intensity  and  the  positive  coefficient  of  the  dummy  for  zero  patent-
intensity, both coefficients are statistically insignificant.  In the regression with 
citation-weighted patents, however, the positive coefficient of the dummy for 
zero  citation-weighted  patent-intensity  becomes  statistically  significant, 
suggesting that targets are indeed more likely to have a zero citation-weighted 
patent-intensity.
xxv    
 
We conclude that the (log) odds of a firm being acquired is positively but non-
linearly related to firm size, and negatively related to profitability, Tobin’s q and 
liquidity.  In relation to targets’ innovative profile, targets are more likely to 
have a high R&D-intensity, a large stock of accumulated knowledge, but no 
R&D output (zero citation-weighted patent-intensity) before they are acquired.   
 
Table 2 also reports the results of estimating the regressions separately for US 
and non-US firms.
xxvi  Not surprisingly, since US targets account for almost 80% 
of  all  targets,  US  targets  appear  to  have  all  the  financial  characteristics 
mentioned  above.    The  only  exception  is  that  although  the  coefficient  of 
operating return in Panel A remains negative it is no longer significant.  They 
also  tend  to  have  a  significantly  higher  R&D-intensity,  a  larger  stock  of 
(citation-weighted)  patents  and they  are  more  likely  to  have  a zero  citation-
weighted patent-intensity.  Non-US targets also appear to have similar financial 
characteristics  as  those  described  for  the  full  sample,  but  the  coefficient  on 
Tobin’s  q  becomes  insignificant.    However,  they  do  not  seem  to  have  a 
particularly  different  innovative  profile  from  non-acquired  firms.    The  only 
significantly different characteristic is a higher patent stock (but only in raw 
form), while there is some indication that they are more likely to be non-R&D-
reporting firms; yet the dummy for missing R&D equals to unity for only about 
17% of the acquired firms.  It should be acknowledged that the small number of  
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acquisitions  by  non-US  firms  in  Panel  B  does  not  allow  us  to  identify  any 
conclusive relationships. 
 
As far as the importance of year, country and industry effects is concerned, the 
following trends emerge on the basis of the relevant dummies included in the 
logit model of Table 2, Panel A.  The acquisition probability peaks in the mid-
1980s,  the  late-1980s/early-1990s,  the  mid-1990s  and  the  late-1990s.
xxvii  
Although this trend follows the world stock market movements (provided by 
Datastream), it seems that there is more in the activity; the marginal effect in 
1995 exceeds that in the late-1990s when market valuations in high technology 
industries skyrocketed.  Canadian and British firms face a takeover threat which 
is almost comparable to that faced by US firms, while Japanese firms appear to 
be the most insulated from the threat of being taken over.  These results are 
broadly  consistent  with  the  distinction  of  systems  into  market-insider  and 
market-outsider systems (Franks and Mayer, 1995; Mayer, 1998).  Firms in SIC 
48,  73  (primarily  software  firms  which  are  also  active  in  computers  and 
computer  equipment)  and  87  (business  services  including  R&D  and  testing 
services) face a relatively higher risk of being taken over, while those in SIC 37 
(transportation), face a considerably lower takeover risk.   
 
Sensitivity checks  
We estimate a specification for a sub-sample of 15,307 observations (including 
176 acquisitions) where data on all financial, R&D and citation-weighted patent-
related variables are available.  The results, presented in the first column of 
Table 3, differ in some respects from those of Table 2.  First, the coefficient on 
operating  return  is  insignificantly  different  from  zero  although  negative.  
Second,  although the  R&D-intensity  coefficient  remains positive, it becomes 
insignificant.  However, these differences reflect the effect of the large fall in 
sample  size  rather  than  any  omitted  variable  bias  from  the  relationships 
established using the two complementary specifications.
xxviii 
 
Finally, we re-estimate the same specification, but this time without normalising 
R&D-intensity to zero when R&D expenditure is missing (second column of 
Table  3).    Again,  we  find  insignificant  coefficients  on  profitability,  R&D-
intensity, as well as on the dummy for zero citation-weighted patent-intensity.  
Still, these coefficients have similar signs to those of Table 2.   
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Table 3. The probability of being acquired: sensitivity checks 
Regressor  All independent variables  Observations with R&D data 
Constant  -6.603*  -6.908* 
  (1.023)  (1.094) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.213*  0.231* 
  (0.069)  (0.073) 
Dummy High T. Assets  -0.931*  -1.040* 
  (0.346)  (0.362) 
Total Assets Growth  -0.009  -0.107 
  (0.115)  (0.163) 
Op. Return   0.063  -0.113 
  (0.6)  (0.627) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  0.033  0.105 
  (0.439)  (0.446) 
Tobin' s q (ln)  -0.284**  -0.282** 
  (0.157)  (0.169) 
Leverage  -0.004  -0.001 
  (0.036)  (0.038) 
Liquidity  -0.057*  -0.051* 
  (0.024)  (0.023) 
R&D-intensity  0.709  0.731 
  (0.496)  (0.511) 
Dummy No R&D  -0.165   
  (0.286)   
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)  0.037**  0.043* 
  (0.022)  (0.024) 
Citation-wtd Patent-intensity  0.300  0.297 
  (0.402)  (0.41) 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity  0.422**  0.406 
  (0.238)  (0.252) 
Country, Industry & Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
No of Observations  15,307  13,649 
No of acquisitions  176  160 
Wald Test  110.3  95.0 
Degrees of Freedom  38  36 
P-value  0.0  0.0 
Log Likelihood  -864.8  -781.3 
Pseudo R-squared  0.10  0.10 
The regressions include countries from Canada, Japan, the UK and the US.  The base country is the US, 
the base industry is SIC 283, and the base year is1998.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A. 
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Further analysis: Acquiring versus acquired firms 
After uncovering the average trends in the characteristics of the acquired firms 
relative to non-acquired firms, we examine for each couple (i.e. acquirer and 
target) in a particular acquisition their relative characteristics using a univariate 
analysis.  The couples of firms are compared with respect to the independent 
variables included in the regression analysis with the addition of the propensity 
to patent in raw and weighted form, which is defined as the number of patents 
over R&D expenditure in $million (1996 prices).
xxix  We explicitly account for 
this  variable  in  the  light  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  model,  which 
implies  that  the  acquired  firms  will  tend  to  have  poor  innovative  efficiency 
relative to their acquirers.  The median differences for the variables of interest 
across all the couples of acquiring-acquired firms with available data and after 
controlling for country, industry and time effects are reported in Table 4.   
 
 
Each acquiring (acquired) firm is matched to a control
xxx non-acquiring (non-
acquired) firm from the same country and industry (primary 2-digit SIC code
xxxi) 
with a size as similar as possible.  Size has been identified as one of the most 
important matching parameters and a number of firm characteristics are likely to 
be  correlated  with  it  (Barber  and  Lyon,  1996).    Then,  for  each  variable  we 
calculate the difference between the acquiring firm minus its matched control 
and the target that it acquires minus its matched control.   This method allows us 
to compare the characteristics for only 276 couples of acquiring and acquired 
firms involving primarily US firms.
xxxii  The last column indicates the proportion 
of positive differences in the total number of non-zero differences.  The null 
hypothesis of no difference in the distributions between acquiring and acquired 




Table 4. Univariate comparisons of acquirers and their acquired units 
 
Acquirers Control-adjusted versus  
Targets Control-adjusted 
  Firm No  Median  % Positive 
Total Assets Growth  276  0.124*  59.8* 
Operating Return  276  0.068*  64.5* 
R&D-intensity   276  -0.002  49.5 
Patent Stock (ln)  276  1.190*  66.3* 
Cite-weighted Patent Stock (ln)  215  1.990*  67.0* 
Patent-intensity  276  0.000  56.3* 
Cite-weighted Patent-intensity  215  0.004*  60.0* 
Propensity to Patent  243  0.042*  61.7* 
Cite-weighted Propensity to Patent  179  0.093*  66.4* 
Total  Assets  are  measured in $1996  thousands.    ln indicates the  natural  logarithm.    % 
Positive is the proportion of positive differences of the total number of non-zero differences.  
*  Statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level,  using  a  two-tailed  Wilcoxon  matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test (see median differences), and a two-tailed Sign test for the % of positive 
differences. 
 
The results imply that the acquirers tend to be statistically significantly faster 
growing and more profitable firms.   Turning to the innovative characteristics, 
the acquirers have a significantly larger stock of accumulated knowledge in both 
raw  and  weighted  form.      They also have a  comparable  R&D-intensity,  but 
interestingly they seem to yield a somewhat higher R&D output (particularly 
citation-weighted patent-intensity).  This fact is also reflected in a significantly 




Our  analysis  suggests  that  acquisition  is  a  very  noisy  phenomenon  and  that 
financial  and technology related  variables  explain  only  a  modest part of  the 
probability of becoming a target.  In broad terms, targets tend to be relatively 
larger compared with non-acquired firms, but beyond a certain point larger size 
reduces the (log) odds of a firm being acquired.  Also, the probability of being 
acquired is negatively related to profitability, Tobin’s q and liquidity.  Focusing 
on the innovative characteristics, it appears that targets, in general, tend to have 
a  relatively  larger  stock  of  citation-weighted  patents  compared  with  non-
acquired  firms.    US  targets,  which  account  for  the  vast  majority  of  sample 
targets, also tend to have a significantly higher R&D-intensity and, they are 
more likely to have a zero citation-weighted patent-intensity in the year before 
they are acquired.  Accounting for firm size and R&D-intensity, the lack of any  
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valuable R&D output can be taken as an indication of target inefficiency in the 
conduct of the R&D process relative to non-acquired firms.  Compared with 
their  acquirers,  targets  have  a  relatively  smaller  stock  of  citation-weighted 
patents, comparable R&D-intensity, but lower citation-weighted patent intensity 
and propensity to patent. 
 
These findings suggest that high technology acquisitions represent a much more 
complex  phenomenon  compared  to  the  two  competing  hypothesis  assumed.  
That is, the rationale of the overall acquisition activity cannot be captured by a 
simple answer to the question whether it is “inferior” or “superior” innovators 
that become acquired.  The findings that targets are more likely to have no R&D 
output before they are acquired relative to non-acquired firms, despite being 
highly  R&D-intensive,  and  that  they  have  lower  R&D  output  and  R&D 
productivity relative to their acquirers, despite a comparable R&D-intensity, are 
broadly consistent with the target “inferiority” hypothesis.  The findings that the 
targets tend to have low profitability and poor growth prospects, reflected in 
their low Tobin’s q, are also in accordance with a wider view of the “inferiority” 
hypothesis, interpreted in economic terms this time.  However, the findings that 
targets  invest  heavily  in  R&D  relative  to  their  asset  base  per  se  and,  most 
importantly, that they have a large stock of accumulated R&D output generated 
by  past  R&D  efforts  relative to non-acquired firms suggest that some  target 
characteristics rather conform to the “superiority” hypothesis.   
 
What seems to be a critical factor in order to reconcile the evidence with the 
abstract theoretical hypotheses is timing.  It appears that, although targets are 
indeed actively involved in R&D and have succeeded in the past in generating 
significant R&D output
xxxiv, even a short-lived short-fall in their R&D pipe-line, 
at  least  when  accompanied  by  poor  current  and  expected  future  economic 
performance, turns out to be enough to increase the likelihood of being acquired.  
In  this  sense,  we  believe  that  high  technology  acquisitions  reflect  a  process 
which  is  primarily  driven  by  acquirers  wishing  to  exploit  the  potential  for 
turning  around  firms  which,  despite  a  good  past  record,  appear  to  be 
innovatively and economically inefficient before they are acquired.  A plausible 
intuitive explanation could be that targets are old firms at a declining stage in 
their life cycle.  In the absence of data on the age of the targets, we can only rely 
on the information provided by their large size and the statistically insignificant 
dummy for firms with large operating return losses, which was employed as a 
proxy for young high-growth firms, that seem to hint toward that direction.   
 
Our results differ, in some respects, from those that are uncovered when all 
manufacturing  firms  are  examined.    Unlike  our  sample’s  high-tech  targets, 
which tend to be relatively large and to have a high R&D-intensity, Hall (1988)  
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finds an insignificant difference from non-acquired firms in terms of both size 
and R&D-intensity, while Hall (1999) finds that acquired firms are somewhat 
small  and  that  the firms  with  very  high  R&D-intensity  are  less  likely  to  be 
acquired.  Apart from differences in the time period covered from the samples, 
these  differences  in  findings  can  be  attributed  to  the  possibility  that  high 
technology acquisitions have unique features.  This view is strengthened by the 
existence  of  similarities  between  our  findings  and  those  of  another  high 
technology specific US study of Addanki (1986).  In both studies it seems that 
publicly traded firms that are acquired are likely to be R&D-intensive firms 
without any (valuable) pre-acquisition patenting activity.  Finally, our findings 
are  consistent  with  the  claim  made  by  Dessyllas  and  Hughes  (2005),  who 
examine  the  innovative  characteristics  of  the  acquirers  using  a  sample  of 
acquisitions similar with ours, that the motive of sourcing innovation-related 
assets is not particularly relevant to acquisitions of public firms, at least as a 
primary explanation.   
 
Our findings suggest that the future research agenda should be directed towards 
two additional relatively unexplored issues, if it is to reach a more thorough 
understanding of the role that acquisitions can play as part of a firm’s broader 
competitive strategy.  First, it would be interesting to perform a similar analysis 
with respect to the much more numerous privately held targets.  The innovative 
“superiority”  hypothesis  is  more  relevant  in  the  case of  acquisitions  of high 
technology start-up private firms (See for example Williamson, 1975).  There is 
evidence to suggest that this is the case at least in the UK where models of 
acquisition in the small unquoted business sector show a positive link between 
innovation and acquisition likelihood (Cosh et al., 1999).  Second, the validity of 
the hypothesised drivers of high technology acquisitions can be re-enforced by 
examining the effect of acquisitions on the economic and, most importantly, the 
innovative performance of the combined entity.  This would allow exploring 




In this paper we investigated the motives of high-tech acquirers by analysing 
their  revealed preferences  in terms  of  the  high-tech  companies they  acquire.  
Using  a  large  sample  of  acquisitions  involving  publicly  traded  firms  from 
various  countries  we  asked  whether  high  technology  acquisitions  are  best 
understood in terms of acquirers seeking to source externally special innovation-
related assets  by  acquiring  firms  with  “superior”  innovative  performance;  or 
acquirers  seeking  to  acquire  firms  with  “inferior”  innovative  performance  in 
order to turn them around and expand.    
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We  found  evidence  that  acquisition  is  a  very  noisy  phenomenon  and  that 
financial  and technology related  variables  explain  only  a  modest part of  the 
probability of becoming a target.  We did, however, find that, compared to non-
acquired  firms,  high  technology  targets  tend to  be  somewhat  larger,  to have 
poorer  profitability  and  lower  Tobin’s  q  and  liquidity.  In  relation  to  their 
innovative profile, targets, in general, seem to have a relatively larger stock of 
accumulated knowledge (stock of citation-weighted patents), and US targets, in 
particular, also tend to have relatively higher R&D inputs (R&D-intensity), but 
they  are  more  likely  to  generate  no  R&D  output  (citation-weighted  patent-
intensity) before they are acquired.   
 
These  findings  suggest  that  the  rationale  of  the  overall  acquisition  activity 
cannot be captured by a simple answer to the question whether it is “inferior” or 
“superior” innovators that become acquired.  The major conclusion that can be 
drawn from our analysis is that high technology acquisitions reflect a process 
which  is  primarily  driven  by  acquirers  wishing  to  exploit  the  potential  for 
turning  around  firms  which,  despite  a  good  past  record,  appear  to  be 




i Blonigen and Taylor’s (2000) analysis does not discriminate between 
acquisitions of public targets and former subsidiaries or private firms. 
ii This estimate is based on 6,635 deals with disclosed value of which 1,547 
involve public targets as reported by Thomson Financial’s SDC. For the 
selection criteria of these deals see the section “Methods”. 
iii This variable is defined as the difference between a firm’s actual and expected 
market value estimated by a model using firm size, R&D and patents as 
regressors. 
iv Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and others have elaborated on the issues that 
need to be addressed for a successful integration of the acquired units. 
v As a result, the market value of the latter will be low compared to the 
replacement cost of their assets. 
vi Hall and Vopel’s classification of industries is based on the industry-level 
R&D-intensity and on an informal assessment of investment horizons.  
According to these criteria, the high technology sector consists of Computers 
and Computer Equipment, Electrical Machinery, Electronic Instruments and 
Communication Equipment, Transportation Equipment, Optical and Medical 
Instruments, and Biopharmaceuticals. 
vii The eight 2-digit SIC codes are as defined by Hall and Vopel (1996) with the 
addition of SIC 73 and 87.  SIC 73 is added to the set of high-tech SICs because 
many of the firms active in 357 Computer And Office Equipment are often 
classified as software companies with primary activity in SIC 737 Computer 
Programming& Data Processing.  SIC 87 is added to the set of high-tech SICs, 
as a large number of the companies selected based on Hall and Vopel 
classification had their primary activity in SIC 873 Research, Development, And 
Testing Services.   
viii German acquiring firms were initially included in the sample but they were 
eventually dropped because of lack of data (in particular, R&D expenditures 
were missing for the population of German firms). 
ix Because it is often argued that acquisitions that are related to disciplining 
inefficient management tend to be hostile and acquisitions that are related with 
reaping synergistic benefits tend to be friendly (See Morck et al., 1988), we 
checked for the number of hostile acquisitions.  Hostile acquisitions account for 
only 2.3% of all deals, and their small number in the sample actually analysed 
does not allow a separate analysis. 
x The citations series is subject to some truncation bias, i.e. patents applied for 




cited in subsequent patents.  To control for this source of bias, citations are 
normalised using the “fixed-effects” approach described in Hall et al. (2001). 
xi Our study is not the first one to employ US patent data for both US and non-
US firms.  Other studies include Bloom and Van Reenen, (2001) and Geroski et 
al., (1996).  Our analysis controls for the possibility of some “home advantage” 
bias, since US firms will tend to have a higher propensity to patent in their 
home-country patent office compared to non-US firms (the latter might tend to 
register relatively more important inventions to the USPTO). 
xii These variables include total assets, total asset growth, operating return, 
Tobin’s q, leverage and liquidity. 
xiii Some studies calculate R&D-intensity as the ratio of R&D-expenditure to 
sales.  Because we proxy firm size by total assets, we use the same variable in 
the denominator of the ratio for consistency reasons. 
xiv All financial variables are expressed in constant 1996 prices using the US 
GDP deflator, which effectively averages how consumers, producers and the 
public sector experience inflation. 
xv We choose to proxy for the stock of accumulated knowledge using the stock 
of patents rather than of R&D expenditure, because the patent series do not 
suffer from the time discontinuities present in the R&D expenditure series.  
xvi This approximation has the advantage over the alternative measures that we 
considered (e.g. Bosworth et al., 2000; Hall, 2000; Blundell et al., 1992) that it 
is easy to calculate and it has better sample coverage than the alternatives.  It has 
shortcomings (Andrade and Stafford (2000)). It assumes that the replacement 
cost of assets and liabilities is well proxied by their book value, it assumes that 
the average and the marginal q are the same, and it ignores tax effects. The 
conceptually correct measure comparing replacement costs to market values 
requires data which is frequently missing in financial datasets, and considerable 
imputation, which made it impractical in this study spanning many countries. 
For a recent discussion of alternative ‘q’ estimators see Lee (1999).   
xvii The main problems are heteroscedastic residuals and predicted probabilities 
often exceeding unity. 
xviii The likelihood ratio test tests that the proportion of the total variance 
contributed by the panel-level variance component equals zero and hence that 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. 
xix We employed the random-effects estimator so that to be able to control for 




xx Recall that total assets, Tobin’s q and the stocks of (citation-weighted) patents 
are transformed using the natural logarithm.  The discussion that follows refers 
to the transformed variables. 
xxi Industry groups are defined at the 2-digit SIC level, with the exception of 
firms in SIC 283 which are distinguished from those in SIC 28 (excluding 283), 
since they are likely to have distinct characteristics, such as a significantly 
higher R&D-intensity. 
xxii We actually find, based on likelihood ratio tests, that such adjustments 
improve the fit of the models. 
xxiii Notice that the patent-based regressions include only firms which have been 
linked to USPTO patent assignees, which may not, however, produce any 
patentable invention in some or all the years. 
xxiv This dummy was introduced after some preliminary regression analysis 
which suggested that targets tend to be larger than “normal”.  This contradicts 
the findings of a large part of the literature examining economy-wide 
acquisitions, where acquired firms tend to be smaller compared with non-
acquired firms (Hughes, 1993).  We therefore suspected a non-linear 
relationship in accordance with Dickerson et al. (1998). The dummy turns out to 
have the predicted (negative) sign and it is statistically significant.  The sign and 
the significance of the rest of the regressors are not affected by the inclusion of 
this dummy, so multicollinearity between the dummy and the continuous size 
variable does not seem to be a problem. 
xxv This is an important trend, as some 184 (56%) of the 328 acquired firms have 
a dummy equal to one.  Also, it seems that the usage of citation-weighted patent 
proxies adds some information to the analysis, since we find that the 
corresponding dummy for zero patent-intensity over the same sample is positive 
but insignificant. 
xxvi Further disaggregation of non-US firms was not possible, particularly for the 
citation-weighted patent regressions, due to the limited number of acquisitions. 
xxvii The effects of the last two years (2001-2) are biased because our acquisition 
data include (successfully completed) deals announced until June 2001.   
xxviii Running the two complementary specifications of Table 2 for the subset of 
observations in Table 3 we derived similar results for profitability and R&D-
intensity to those reported in Table 3. 
xxix As will be seen, the (citation-weighted) propensity to patent is reported for a 
smaller number of deals, because the ratio is not defined when R&D expenditure 




xxx The potential controls of an acquiring firm are firms which were not active in 
any takeover activity over the three pre- and post-merger years, and that 
potential controls for an acquired firm are non-acquired firms during the three 
years following the year in which the firm in question is acquired.  The 
imposition of this takeover abstinence window for controls is adopted since we 
carry out a one-to-one matching. 
xxxi The only exceptions are firms in 283 which are specifically matched to 283 
control firms, and firms in SIC 28 (excluding 283) are matched to SIC 28 
(excluding 283) controls (See footnote xxi). 
xxxii The 276 deals analysed involve 253 US acquiring firms and 269 US 
acquired firms.  Because data on citations are available until 1997, comparisons 
on citation-weighted patent-based variables are only possible for 215 deals. 
xxxiii The Sign test tests whether the proportion of positive differences equals 
50%, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, in addition to the signs of 
differences, also takes into account their magnitude.  Statistical significance is 
assessed at a 5% level. 
xxxiv Recall that the patent stock is calculated using a 15% annual depreciation 
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